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Resolving Sovereign Debt: Collective Action
Clauses or the Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Mechanism
Shalendra D. SHAP-MA*
When sovereign debt restructuring or debt reduction becomes unavoidable, what
is the appropriate regime that can provide for an orderly restructuring, while at the same
time protecting the rights of both creditors and the debtor? The recent wave of
sovereign default has underscored the limits of the current market-based regime.
Recently two alternative approaches propose a "contractual approach" by way of the
introduction of collective action clauses (CAC) in bond contracts, and a "statutory
approach" put forward by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which calls for the
establishment of an international debt restructuring mechanism (called the sovereign
debt restructuring mechanism or SDRM) that would have many of the features of an
international bankruptcy regime. This paper assesses the two crisis-resolution
mechanisms. It shows that although no consensus exists on whether the best
approach about how to manage and resolve sovereign debt crises is to promote the use
of collective action clauses, or to create a statutory mechanism, it is, nevertheless,
evident that the SDRM is shelved for the time being.
It examines the reasons for this, and argues that to the contrary, a complementary
approach that combines elements of both the CAC and the SDRM (now proposed by
the IMF) has the potential to help reduce the unacceptably large costs associated with
disorderly defaults by sovereign governments whose debt burdens have become
unsustainable.
I. INTRODUCTION
When countries run up unsustainable debt burdens and have no feasible
macroeconomic policy options to resolve the problem, they must seek a
restructuring of their obligations. However, in the international financial system
there is no established framework for the predictable and orderly restructuring of
sovereign debts, nor a comprehensive mechanism for private creditor majority
decision-making. This problem is compounded when the debt is comprised of
numerous debt instruments and issued in different jurisdictions. Under such
circumstances, as a sovereign debt crisis unfolds, many creditors "rush to the exits"
as they try to liquidate their claims at the same time, causing a crisis with painfiil (and
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usually avoidable) costs for both the creditors and the debtor country. In the face of
destructive economic meltdown and often disorderly and protracted debt restructuring,
the IMF and the G-7 are forced to step in with huge bailout packages.
As debt-restructuring negotiations under the arrangements of both the Paris Club
(which deals with debt owed to official-sector creditors) and the London Club (which
deals with debt owed to private sector creditors) have been protracted and divisive, over
the years there have been several discussions regarding the creation of a more effective
institutional framework to deal with sovereign debt. 1 Proposals have ranged from calls
for an international bankruptcy court to market-based debt buybacks. In the late 1980s,
the Brady plan recognized the legitimacy of international debt reduction and brought
about a real reduction in the debt that some countries owed to commercial banks.
Following the 1994-1995 Mexican peso crisis, Jeffrey Sachs proposed an international
bankruptcy regime modelled on Chapter 11 of the US bankruptcy code which would
give insolvent countries the same protection from creditors as insolvent private firms, 2
while Eichengreen and Portes proposed a combination of contractual and institutional
changes, claiming that such an approach would not require an international bankruptcy
court.3 However, a series of devastating financial crises beginning with the Asian
meltdown in 1997 and culminating in Argentina's unprecedented default in 2001
renewed the debate about how best to prevent crises and resolve the resultant debt
workout problems. Indeed, as it became clear that the Argentine crisis was made worse
as a result of the deadlock caused by its default, observers (especially at the IMF),
became more convinced that Argentina's problem could have been mitigated had a
formal debt restructuring system been available. 4
II. THE KR.UEGER PROPOSAL
It is in this context, that on 26 November 2001, Anne Krueger the first deputy
managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) made a bold policy
proposal regarding how to facilitate workouts of distressed sovereign debts. 5 She observed
that, "we lack incentives ... to help countries with unsustainable debts resolve them
I In fact, the rescheduling of official bilateral debt in low-income countries through the Paris Club produced
little long-term relief Instead, it led to a rapid build-up of debt because of the accumulation of interest on
rescheduled claims.
2 Chapter 11 allows companies to continue operating and to repay creditors' claims from future earnings
rather than from the proceeds of liquidating their assets. This is made possible because there is a stay on litigation
against the company that was initiated before bankruptcy filing and on litigation after the filing. Companies may
obtain new loans (i.e. debtor-in-possession financing) that are senior to all claims that existed before the filing.3 Jeffrey Sachs, "Do we need an International Lender of Last Resort?" Graham Lecture, Princeton
University, 1995. Barry Eichengreen and Robert Portes, Crisis? What Crisis? Orderly Workouts for Sovereign Debtors
(London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 1995).
4 Michael Mussa, Argentina and the Fund: From Triumph to Tragedy (Washington, D.C.: Institute for
International Economics, 2002).
5 See "International Financial Architecture for 2002: A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring".
Address by Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Director, International Monetary Fund, given at the National
Economists Club Annual Members' Dinner American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C. 26 November
2001.
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promptly and in an orderly way. At present the only available mechanism requires the
international community to bail out the private creditors. It is high time this hole was
filled."'6 To fill this hole, Krueger announced that the IMF was considering establishing a
universal statutory framework that would create a legal framework for collective decision-
making by debtors and a supernajority of creditors. Such a framework, Krueger noted,
was urgently needed because domestic bankruptcy law (while a useful model in the
insolvency context), has only limited applicability given the unique characteristics of a
sovereign state. Moreover, the existing approach to crisis resolution which relies on large
bailouts creates a moral hazard and undermines long-term financial stability because the
international system lacks an effective legal framework for the predictable and orderly
restructuring of sovereign debt. Indeed, Krueger's proposal was an implicit
acknowledgement that the way the IMF and other multilateral financial institutions
deal with financial crises needed a fundamental overhaul.
Krueger argued that the Fund's proposed "Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Mechanism" (SDRM), based on five key principles would provide for prompt,
orderly and predictable restructuring of unsustainable debt. Specifically, under the
SDRM the sovereign debtor would, if needed, have protection from disruptive legal
action by creditors during negotiations. This could be provided, in appropriate
circumstances, through a stay on litigation and preventing creditors from seeking court
decisions for repayment while negotiations were under way. Second, creditors would
be provided with assurance that debtors will negotiate in good faith and will pursue
policies designed to protect the value of creditor claims. Third, creditors would be
permitted to protect and prioritize new private lending during the restructuring process
in order to facilitate ongoing economic activity through the continued provision of,
inter alia, trade credits (similar to Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession financing7). Fourth, a
supermajority of creditors could vote to accept new terms under a restructuring
agreement. If new terms were adopted, minority creditors would be prevented from
blocking such agreements or enforcing the terms of the original debt contracts. And,
fifth, a dispute-resolution forum would be established to verify the claims of different
parties to the negotiation. This forum would assure the integrity of the voting process,
and adjudicate disputes that might arise.
6 Krueger, ibid., p. 1.
7 Up to the mid-1970s, bankruptcy provisions were largely biased in favour of creditors. That is, a
bankruptcy petition could be filed either by the debtor or creditor, requesting a court of law to declare that an
individual or company was insolvent and could not meet its debt service commitments. The court then appointed a
receiver to investigate whether a debtor was indeed insolvent, and if the receiver considered it necessary, they could
call a meeting of creditors to find out whether they wished to declare the debtor bankrupt. If so, the company
would enter liquidation-its assets sold and the proceeds distributed as per specified norms among the creditors and
shareholders. In the United States, under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, an effort was made to
redress the obvious bias in favour of creditors. As noted earlier, Chapter 11 allows a firm to apply to a court of law
for protection from its creditors while it undertakes restructuring to pay off its debts. Similarly, in the United
Kingdom, under the Insolvency Act 1985 and 1986, firms can be placed under administration rather than
liquidation with the affairs of insolvent debtors being the responsibility of a registered insolvency practitioner. Thus
Chapter 11 and insolvency provisions in the United States and the United Kingdom are laws that provide for an
intermediate step between financial distress and liquidation and thus seek to provide some degree of protection to
debtors.
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Arguably, the SDRM is one of the more "radical" proposals the IMF has made. If
implemented, it would enable a sovereign debtor and a supermajoity of its creditors to
reach an agreement binding all creditors for all the debt of the sovereign while respecting
the seniority of claims. Further, it provides a mechanism which, when activated, would
enable creditors and debtors to negotiate a restructuring, aggregating across instruments,
and ratifying an agreement binding on all by a specified supermajority. As with a
domestic insolvency law, the SDRM would aggregate claims for voting purposes and
could apply to all existing claims. An independent and centralized dispute resolution
forum would be established to verify claims, insure the integrity of the voting process,
and adjudicate disputes that might arise. Thus, the SDRM effectively would provide a
legal basis for decisions by a debtor and a qualified majority to be made binding on all
creditors. Perhaps, more controversially, the SDRM would under certain conditions
allow a government's international debt repayments to be temporarily suspended while
negotiations were taking place on restructuring the debt. As Krueger aptly noted, the
establishment of an effective SDRM would not only fill a glaring weakness in the
emerging international financial architecture by ensuring the timely and orderly
restructuring of unsustainable sovereign debts, but also put debtors and creditors rather
than the IMF in the driver's seat regarding debt negotiations.
III. R EACTION AND THE REVISED KRUEGER PROPOSAL
Anne Krueger's proposal quickly became the subject of intense discussion and
debate. Indeed, as Lex Rieffel notes "representatives of the private sector reacted with
horror for the most part". 8 At the Institute for International Economics, a Washington
DC think-tank, on 1 April 2002, a distinguished group of speakers, including Krueger,
presented arguments for and against the SDRM. Most surprising was the response of
John Taylor, Under Secretary of the US Treasury for International Affairs, and one-
time colleague of Krueger at Stanford. It was widely believed that Krueger, a Bush
nominee with strong connections with the administration, including the US Treasury,
would get her way with the SDRM. In fact, the Treasury initially supported her idea.
However, Taylor proposed an alternative contractual approach involving the
introduction of new clauses into bond contracts to facilitate debt restructuring
because in the Treasury's view the SDRM required more research and clarification
before it could be made operational. 9 To put it more bluntly, the US Treasury was
dumping the SDRM in favour of collective action on new clauses in debt contracts.
8 Lex Rieffel, Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Case for Ad Hoc Machinery (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution Press, 2003), p. 5. Others have noted that "faced with the possibility of a more radical solution, market
participants, until recently unrelenting critics of collective action clauses, embraced them as, from their perspective,
the lesser of evils". Barry Eichengreen, Kenneth Kletzer and Ashoka Mody, Crisis Resolution: Next Steps, IMF
Working Paper No. WP/03/196 (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 2003).
9John B. Taylor, "Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A US Perspective". Remarks at the Institute for
International Economics Conference on "Sovereign Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hazards", Institute for
International Economics, Washington, D.C., 2 April 2002.
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Specifically, under the Treasury proposal, sovereign bonds governed by the laws of the
United States, Germany, and other key jurisdictions would also include collective
action clauses. However, it would be a particular type of a collective action clause--a
majority action clause that would allow a supermajority of bondholders to alter the key
financial terms of a bond. More importantly, it called for sovereign borrowers and
creditors to insert a package of new "contingency clauses" into future bond contracts
designed to set forth the modalities of a sovereign debt workout, and in particular,
describe the process to be followed if restructuring proved necessary. These new types
of clauses (dubbed "engagement clauses" and "initiation clauses") would provide for
early dialogue, coordination, and communication among creditors and a sovereign, and
limit disruptive legal actions. Thus, the Treasury proposal envisaged what is called a
"market-based and decentralized approach". There were a number of reasons for
this. First, the clauses themselves would be developed and agreed to by creditors and
the issuers in a decentralized way. Sovereign borrowers along with their creditors and
their lawyers would work out the details as new bonds would be issued. Eventually,
new templates with these clauses would replace existing templates without the clauses.
Thus, unlike the SDRM, the Treasury approach would focus on separately
restructuring different types of debt on different bond issues. Second, in the event of
a restructuring, the sovereign government and its creditors would work out the terms
of the restructuring on their own guided by the clauses but without the involvement of
a central group or panel. Third, the clause approach could be implemented quickly,
while the SDRM approach would require a good deal of time in light of its relative
complexity and the need to gain legislative approval, including in the United
States. And, fourth, Taylor announced that the G-7 had endorsed the US position,
while encouraging the IMF to continue to work to refine its plan.
In her presentation, Krueger politely noted that, "thanks in no small part to the
many useful inputs we have received from academics, the private creditor community,
non-governmental organizations, and our member countries ... our thinking has
progressed since last November". 10 In a rather detailed document released in mid-April
2002 (and with the backing of the IMFC or the International Monetary and Financial
Committee, the Fund's policy-setting arm), Krueger's revised proposal now included
two complementary approaches deemed "critical" to an orderly and predictable process
for sovereign debt restructuring."I Complementing SDRM was a contractual approach
(the so-called "collective action clauses" or CACs), under which debt restructurings
would be facilitated by enhanced use of certain contractual provisions in sovereign debt
contracts.
10 Anne Krueger, "New Approaches to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: An Update on Our Thinking".
Address at conference on "Sovereign Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hazards", Institute for International Economics,
Washington, D.C., 1 April 2002.
11 Anne Krueger, A New Sovereign Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring (Washington, D.C.: IMF, April
2002).
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Indeed, as noted earlier, the idea behind the use of CAC was hardly new.
Contractual provisions designed to facilitate an orderly restructuring of problem debts
have long been suggested as an alternative to expensive rescue packages for debtor
countries, or those experiencing a sudden outflow of capital leading to a sovereign debt
crisis. Collective-action clauses, which are typically included in bonds subject to UK
law, allow a qualified majority of bondholders to pass binding resolutions altering the
value and timing of interest payments. This contrasts with bonds subject to US law (in
practice, the law of the State of New York) under whose terms the unanimous consent
of all bondholders is required. The addition of such clauses is usually seen as a small step
in the direction of providing some of the functions of an international bankruptcy
court. In fact, this is exactly what was suggested by the G-10 following the Mexican
peso crisis and endorsed in a series of G-7 and G-22 reports in the second half of the
1990s. Given the then US Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin's strong endorsement of
collective-action clauses in 1999, and G-7 finance ministers endorsing them at their
Cologne Summit, and at the beginning of 2000, the UK government issued an
international bond including collective action provisions. In April 2000, the Canadian
government committed itself to include collective-action provisions in all its future
international bonds. 12 In 2003, Brazil in a US$ 1 billion sovereign debt offering in the
US market also announced that it was adopting CACs. Brazil decided to concentrate
on clauses relating to the maturity date, interest rate and principal amount, and clauses
to reduce the portion of the principal amount that is payable in the event of an
acceleration of the maturity of the bonds, as well as other payment terms. 13
Thus, Krueger noted that since the contractual approach is already an accepted
practice in some markets (but, more universally in sovereign debt contracts), and the
SDRM or the statutory approach designed to create a legal foundation for collective
action among creditors, it would help bring about faster and more orderly
restructuring. Specifically, Krueger pointed out that the CACs would have sovereign
borrowers and their creditors put new clauses into their external bond contracts. The
clauses would provide a roadmap describing as precisely as possible what happens when
a country decides it has to restructure its debt. In this way the contracts would create a
more orderly and predictable workout process. The CACs would apply to individual
bond issues. Sovereign borrowers and their creditors would work out the details as the
new bonds are issued. Under a majority action clause, it would permit a specified
12 The specific collective action clauses that Canada intends to adopt include collective representation,
majority action and non-acceleration clauses. Specifically, collective representation clauses facilitate restructuring
discussions between issuers and bondholders. Majority action clauses are intended to prevent restructuring
proposals from being blocked by minority bondholders. And, non-acceleration clauses are designed to help
restructuring discussions by discouraging individual bondholder action to accelerate the terms of repayment.
13 Brazil became the first non-investment grade sovereign to issue bonds with collective action clauses in the
US market when it completed an offering of US$ 1 billion aggregate principal amount of 10 percent Global Bonds
due 2007, on 6 May 2003. The new bonds contain collective action clauses, which permit certain amendments and
waivers that formerly required unanimous consent to be approved by holders of 85 percent or more of the bonds.
The clauses also require a vote of holders of not less than 25 percent of the bonds to accelerate the maturity of the
bonds after an event ofdefault-Brazil's prior debt issues had permitted each holder to accelerate its bond following
the occurrence of certain types of events of default.
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supermajority of holders of the bond issue to agree to a restructuring that would be
binding on all holders of that issue. Moreover, the majority bondholders could change
the financial terms of the bond, an engagement/representation clause to facilitate
information flow between sovereign borrowers and their creditors and provide for the
election of a bondholders' representative, and a clause limiting disruptive legal action.
This would prevent hold-outs in individual bond issues, thereby facilitating any needed
restructuring. A registry of holders, or trustee arrangements, could accelerate the
process. Krueger noted that the use of such CACs would be an improvement over the
current system and that the IMF is committed to promoting their use among its
member countries.
IV. "CovmNING" THE SDRM AND THE CAC
No doubt, the absence of a predictable, orderly and rapid process for restructuring
the debts of sovereigns remains a major problem. Currently sovereign borrowers often
find it very difficult to get its creditors to agree collectively to a restructuring that
reduces the net present value of its obligations to a manageable level. Even if such a
restructuring would be in the interests of creditors as a group, some may prefer to "free-
ride", hoping that they will ultimately be repaid in line with their original contracts. 14
Similarly, a debtor country may all too often delay a necessary restructuring until the
last possible moment, draining its reserves and increasing the eventual cost of restoring
sustainability. Creditors also suffer when fears about some being unfairly favoured over
others block agreement on a restructuring. Indeed, creditors often "rush to the exits"
because they fear that restructuring will be disorderly. This can leave all parties
concerned with no option but to accept a disruptive and potentially contagious
unilateral default--or a bailout of private creditors that contributes to moral hazard. In
the end the citizens of the defaulting country experience greater hardship than they
need to, and the international community through the IMF has a tougher task, helping
pick up the pieces.
Since there is currently no international insolvency code that can help a country
and its creditors rapidly reach agreement on a restructuring (as is done with companies),
sovereign debt restructuring too often spirals into a disorderly process, especially if
some creditors hold out against an agreement reached by a majority of creditors. A
formal restructuring mechanism like the proposed SDRM (modelled on corporate
bankruptcy law) would allow countries to seek legal protection from creditors that
stand in the way. In exchange debtors would have to negotiate with their creditors in
good faith, besides pursuing policies that would help protect their claims. Indeed, a
formal SDRM would greatly mitigate the problem because its five key principles (listed
below) would provide protection to both creditors and the debtor.
14 For example, credit derivatives may provide investors with incentives to hold out in the hope of forcing a
default, thereby triggering a repayment under the terms of the derivative contract.
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(1) Creditors would not be allowed to disrupt negotiations by seeking recourse in
their own national courts. To this effect, the aim is to establish a statutory
approach to establish a universal legal framework to facilitate negotiations and
to empower a supermajority of creditors to approve a debt restructuring
agreement with a debtor country. Minority creditors would be prevented
from blocking such agreements.
(2) Debtor countries would need to provide assurances that they are negotiating
in good faith and treating all creditors equally. Moreover, the creditors would
be given some assurances that the debtor will negotiate in good faith and will
pursue policies-most likely to be designed in conjunction with seeking
financial support from the IMF, that help protect the value of creditor claims
and help limit the dislocation in the economy.
(3) Private creditors would be encouraged to lend new money by receiving some
guarantee that they would be repaid ahead of existing private creditors; and
(4) A dispute resolution forum to oversee the process, including verify claims,
ensure the integrity of the voting process, adjudicate possible disputes and
certify the debt-restructuring agreement.
(5) Once agreement on a restructuring has been reached by a large enough
majority of creditors (about 75 percent), the rest would be bound to accept the
terms.
A notable feature of the SDRNM is that countries would come to the IMF and
request a temporary standstill on their debts (probably lasting a few months), while the
country negotiates a rescheduling or restructuring. Specifically, IMF endorsement of a
request for debt restructuring would activate the standstill. Extensions would not only
require IMF approval, a temporary stay (or standstill) on creditor litigation would be
enforced while negotiations for a restructuring agreement were under way. This would
help prevent a "grab-race" by individual creditors seeking to have their debts repaid
ahead of others. Also, during the period of the stay, there would be limitations on the
debtor's actions to prevent it from harming the interests of creditors. As a further
protection, the SDRM may also require the imposition of temporary exchange controls
to stop sovereign default and money from fleeing the country, including debt held by
residents, even if they are held in local currency.' 5 The reasoning is that residents might
engage in financial abuses such as capital flight-and in the process upset asset values
and the bond structuring programme, besides undermining the country's ability to
return to generalized debt servicing.
15 Of course, the advantages of controls have to be weighed against the risk that they might broaden a
sovereign crisis to potentially solvent private firms. Krueger suggests that some mechanism could be designed to
provide limited legal protection to otherwise viable domestic firms that might be prevented from servicing their
debts solely by the controls. Moreover, controls should be accompanied by policies that would allow them to be
lifted as soon as possible. That is, countries should not be encouraged to leave them in place longer than they are
needed.
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As Krueger has often noted, the primary objective in creating such a formal
mechanism is to create incentives for debtors and creditors to reach agreement on their
own, so the mechanism would rarely need to be used. Krueger makes it clear that the
most innovative aspect of the SDRM is that it will enable a majority of creditors (across
the broad range of credit instruments) to make the terms of restructuring binding on
the rest. That is, all creditors would be obliged to comply with a plan approved by a
large enough majority. Furthermore, a supermajority of creditors could vote to accept
new terms under a restructuring agreement; minority creditors would be prevented
from blocking such agreements or enforcing the terms of the original debt contracts.
That is, they would be bound by the decision of the majority. How would decisions
made by the debtor and a majority of creditors be made binding on all creditors? For
Krueger, part of the solution is the wider use of CACs (which would allow a majority
of creditors to impose a deal on the remaining minority), thereby help resolve some
debt problems. Specifically, the sovereign debtor would have legal protection from
disruptive legal action by creditors while negotiations were under way. This would be
provided through a vote by a supermajority of creditors to approve a stay on litigation.
Moreover, Krueger explicitly notes that the voting process would include the claims of
all creditors regardless of the type of instrument (bonds, bank loans, derivatives) so that
a comprehensive restructuring of all debt would be possible. She notes that this would
help mitigate the free-rider problem, thereby making early agreement more likely, and
reducing the threat of unilateral legal action by creditors after a sovereign default. Yet,
fully aware that CACs will solve only part of the problem, she suggests that a universal
treaty rather than piecemeal changes to national legislation is necessary. Such a treaty
would set up an international judicial panel much like a formal bankruptcy court with
universal force of law to arbitrate disputes, besides creating a single dispute resolution
forum to assure integrity to the process and to avoid ambiguities of language or
interpretation.
V. THE KRUEGER PROPOSAL: PROS AND CONS
During the debt crisis of the 1980s, collective action problems were limited by the
presence of a relatively small number of large creditors, by contractual provisions in
syndicated loans that deterred litigation, by the desire of banks to maintain good
relations with the debtor to secure future business, and, on occasion, by moral suasion
from supervisory authorities. Restructuring took time, but was in most cases orderly.
However, the greater integration of capital markets and a shift from syndicated bank
loans to traded securities and bond issuance have both had a profound impact on the
way that emerging market countries finance themselves. Sovereign borrowers
increasingly issue debt in a range of legal jurisdictions, using a variety of instruments,
to a diverse and diffuse group of creditors. Different creditors have different time
horizons for their investments, which means that they respond differently to economic
shocks that affect a borrowing country's ability to service its debt. Moreover, these
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changes have made creditor coordination much more cumbersome. This in turn has
made it more difficult for all concerned to predict how the restructuring process will
unfold. Many creditors now have no ongoing business relationship with the debtor to
protect. Their interests are more diverse. They are less subject to moral suasion. And
some now specialize in buying distressed debt cheaply and suing for full payment.
Compounding this problem is the fact that far-reaching developments in capital
markets over the past decade have not been matched by the development of an orderly,
predictable framework for creditor coordination, in which the roles of the debtor, the
creditors and the international community are clearly spelt out.
Krueger's proposal if comprehensively implemented would represent a significant
improvement over existing arrangements. The new mechanism would create a more
efficient debt restructuring process by allowing countries to resolve debt problems in an
orderly way. Yet, the challenges to create an effective SDRM remain daunting. First,
debt restructuring has become more complicated over the past two decades, in part
because of the growing use of bonds and derivatives. Bondholders are more numerous,
anonymous and difficult to coordinate than banks. They also have a bigger incentive to
sue debtors for repayment. Getting them all to the table and to agree is easier said than
done.
As noted earlier, from the time Krueger unveiled her initial proposal, it has faced a
growing chorus of criticisms. Her revised proposal has hardly calmed the critics. For
example, the George Soros Open Society Institute, along with several other non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), have stated that they would only support an
SDRM that included a mechanism to allow ordinary citizens to be involved in
discussions on debt restructuring-thereby serving as a "partial remedy for the lack of
democracy, transparency and accountability that exist in governments." They also want
the SDRM to cover IMF loans (other than concessional loans), and "that permitted
loans extended to corrupt regimes be written off when creditors should reasonably have
known about the corruption". 16 Moreover, NGOs have criticized the SDRM because
of their concern that the Fund would continue to play a key role in assessing the
sustainability of the country's external position, including its debt. This, they argue, not
only puts the IMF in the position of dictating the terms of any settlement between a
debtor country and its creditors, but also it is incompatible with the role of the IMF as a
creditor itself, and, indeed, a preferred one. 17 However, such arguments are misguided
16 The argument to cancel corruptly accumulated debt (or "odious debt") remains highly problematic. The
IMF has questioned its practicality until some key issues are first resolved. In particular, who decides which debt
falls into the odious category? What criteria are to be applied in deciding who ought to bear the costs of dealing
with odious debt? For example, if the odious debt deals were cut between one government and another, who
should decide, and by what criteria, what balance should be struck between the wronged citizens of the debtor
country and the taxpayers of the creditor country who would absorb the cost of the debt relief? All sides have their say
on SDRMproposal, 31 IMF Survey 18 (7 October 2002), p. 297. Also see Romilly Greenhill, Ann Pettifor, Henry
Northover and Ashok Sinha, Did the G8 Drop the Debt (London: Jubilee Debt Campaign, 2003).
17 Some have argued that in the interest of ensuring economic viability of the sovereign following debt
restructuring as well as fairness in the treatment ofall creditors, the coverage of debt under the SDRM should be
widened to include the claims of official creditors (Paris Club) and international financial institutions. See Views of
SDRM Differ, 32 IMF Survey 3 (17 February 2003).
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for two reasons. First, the IMF since its inception has been treated as a preferred
creditor by debtor countries and by other creditors such as private banks, capital
markets, and bilateral official creditors because of the Funds role in providing financing
to its member countries in times of crisis-that is, when other sources of credit are not
available. Thus, it is not only appropriate for the Fund to have preferred status, without
such protection crisis financing would simply not be forthcoming. It also means that
when debt relief is sought, the other creditors must provide a greater share of the
resources than would be the case if the IMF comparably reduced its own claims.
Secondly, since the integrity of the process would be ensured through the Sovereign
Debt Dispute Resolution Forum-which would be independent of the Fund-the
claim that the IMF would dictate terms is not compelling.
More troubling, a wide array of creditors' lobbies (representing investors,
international banks and those involved in bond issuance and trading) has been against
it.18 They have questioned the competence of the IMF to act as an arbiter when the
Fund itself is a creditor, besides suggesting that the Fund is pushing for the SDRM
because it considers bonds easier to restructure as the necessary antidote to so-called
official sector bail-outs.1 9 Their other concerns include: How would an SDR.M work,
and who would decide whether a country's sovereign debt burden is unsustainable?
Would all sovereign debt be covered? What would be the IMF's role? And, how might
the SDRM affect private sector flows to emerging markets and borrowing costs?
To meet the growing chorus of criticisms, Krueger has continued to modify her
proposals. She has proposed that an independent dispute resolution forum (possibly
serving as a judicial body within the IMF) would be established to verify claims, ensure
the integrity of the voting process, and adjudicate inter-creditor disputes that might
arise, and arbitrate on claims. The IMF's role would continue to be that of signalling its
willingness to provide financial assistance for the government adjustment programme,
rather than getting in the middle of discussions between creditors and debtors. Even if
the judicial body was set within the IMF, Krueger has assured that this will not involve
a major extension of the Fund's legal authority. Instead, it could be agreed that control
over the key decisions would rest with the debtor and a supermajority (about 75
percent) of the creditors. But, so far this has been to no avail.
18 For example, see the 3 June 2002 joint letter from representatives of the Emerging Markets Traders
Association, the Institute of International Finance, the International Primary Market Association, the Bond Market
Association, the Securities Industry Association and the Emerging Markets Creditor Association, to former US
Treasury Secretary O'Neill available at <http://emta.org.ndevelop/oneill.pdf\. Also see EMTA Bulletin 2 (3rd
Quarter 2002).
19 Responding to such criticism Krueger has replied that, "People have questioned whether it would be
appropriate for the Fund to interfere in the relationship between debtor and creditors, and to impose the terms of a
restructuring on them. The simple answer is that we would have no intention of doing so and could not do so. The
Fund would be mandating the process within which a restructuring would be negotiated, but not the outcome.
The restructuring terms would emerge from negotiations between the debtor and creditors. But once the necessary
majority of creditors had agreed the terms, the mechanism would make it possible to bind in minority creditors,
thereby resolving the collective action problem." Also see, Jack Boorman, Alternative Approaches to Sovereign Debt
Restncturing, 23 Cato Journal 1 (Spring-Summer 2003), pp. 59-71.
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It seems that the real bone of contention lies in Krueger's oft-repeated statements
that while the more ambitious use of collective action clauses could contribute
significantly to more efficient sovereign debt restructuring, a purely contractual
approach cannot resolve all the weaknesses of the current system. Put bluntly, this
implies that any new framework to encourage more orderly and timely debt
restructuring would require a statutory basis. To this, the private sector lobbies have
argued that the proposed SDRM is not only unnecessary, but it also abrogates investor
rights. They note that the current system is actually working quite well. It has not
prevented sovereigns restructuring their liabilities via exchange offers in which
bondholders voluntarily tender their existing securities for new securities that modify
(and effectively reduce) the sovereign's payments structure into a sustainable stream of
payments. They have repeatedly drawn attention to the fact that Pakistan, Ecuador,
Ukraine and Russia have all managed to restructure their debts (besides securing debt
service relief and write-downs of principal) under such exchanges, even in
circumstances where there were large numbers of diverse creditors. 20 Except in the
case of Peru, there was no other instance where governments did not get the
cooperation of bondholders. Second, the lobbies fear that Krueger's proposal will make
default an easy way out. However, the Fund has noted that the prospect of economic
dislocation, political upheaval, and possible long-term loss of access to international
capital markets will still make countries loath to default on their debt service obligations
in all but the most extreme circumstances. Third, the critics point out that sovereign
debtors already have certain rights-namely, sovereign immunity and the ability to
determine domestic policies with no input from creditors-that do not exist in
domestic bankruptcy systems.
Thus, not only are there good reasons not to give sovereigns some of the
protections available to debtors in domestic systems, any attempt to make defaults
smoother is misguided because default should not made too easy for debtors. Indeed,
the lobby has suggested that if any changes are to be made, it must include
strengthening creditor rights, rather than making restructuring easier for debtors. Of
course, these claims run counter to the Fund-which has observed that in most recent
bond restructuring programmes, there has been no reduction in debt. It is because the
countries in crisis negotiated from a position of weakness. Suffice to note, the situation
would be reversed if debtors negotiated under the cover of the SDRM and banks might
have to reduce their claims. Clearly, this prospect has disturbed the bankers more than
any other. Finally, emerging market countries have raised concerns that the mechanism
will make it more expensive for them to access foreign capital. The Fund has
20 Ukraine is an interesting case in point. Ukraine's restructuring is frequently held up as a successful
example. But even in this case, complications arose because one of Ukraine's bonds in the restructuring did not
have majority action clauses. As a result, the authorities needed to track down the bondholders and try to secure
100 percent consent to amend the financial terms of their bonds. This proved especially difficult because retail
investors owned a large portion of this bond. Nevertheless, these problems were not insurmountable in the case of
Ukraine largely because the authorities had only a small number of external debt instruments outstanding. Of
course, this is not the case for many other emerging market countries.
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downplayed this distinct possibility, arguing that a more orderly and predictable
framework would help lenders and investors discriminate between good and bad risks
more effectively. That is, by reducing moral hazard and making borrowing costs better
reflect true risks, should help countries with good policies attract capital more cheaply,
while at the same time help prevent countries with weak policies from building up
excessive debts that might leave them vulnerable to potential crises. While the Fund has
correctly noted that in the long run the SDRM will make it easier and cheaper for
emerging market countries with strong policies to access foreign capital, such
arguments have hardly quelled private sector concerns.
However, a purely contractual approach cannot resolve all the weaknesses of the
current system. For example, a recent study by Barry Eichengreen and Ashoka Mody
finds that contrary to the view of many policymakers, including market participants,
collective-action clauses in fact reduce borrowing costs for the most creditworthy
borrowers, while raising it for less creditworthy borrowers-often the poorest
countries. 21 Specifically, they find that collective-action clauses raise borrowing costs
for less credit-worthy borrowers (by on average 150 basis points), while lowering them
for more creditworthy borrowers (by on average 50 basis points). 22 These findings are
significant (relative to a typical emerging-market spread of 600 basis points). Indeed,
these findings should be taken seriously as Eichengreen and Mody's study compares the
spreads on British-style bonds in the London market (where collective-action clauses
are typically present), and equivalent US-style instruments-where such clauses are
typically absent.23 Their data, from the Capital Bondware database, contain 2,619
bonds-virtually every international bond (municipal, state, corporate and sovereign
alike) issued by emerging markets between 1991 and 1998. Focusing on bonds subject
to UK law and US law, Eichengreen and Mody analyse the impact of legal provisions
on spreads, while factoring in such variables as the maturity of the issue, whether it was
privately placed, whether the issuer was private or governmental, the currency in which
the issue was denominated, whether the interest rate was fixed or floating, global
financial conditions, and a variety of country characteristics such as
macroeconomic variables, financial variables, including a measure of political risk.
Eichengreen and Mody's analysis underscores the fact that while more credit-worthy
borrowers benefit from the ability to avail themselves of an orderly restructuring
process, for less creditworthy issuers the benefits are offset by the moral hazard and
additional perceived default risk associated with the presence of renegotiation-friendly
loan provisions and greater ease of restructuring. In the short run, mandating the
21 Barry Eichengreen and Ashoka Mody, Would Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs?, NBER
Working Paper No. 7458 (2000).
22 In other words, Eichengreen and Mody believe that those who enjoy a rating of above 50 on the
Institutional Investor scale benefit because of advantages of provisions facilitating an orderly restructuring.
23 Since British law provides for holders of debt securities to call a bondholder assembly with the power to
appoint a representative to negotiate with the debtor, including the provision for majority voting with a resolution
binding on all bondholders, providing the required majority has agreed, the authors make allowances for the
different sorts of borrowers operating under the two regimes and for the currency vehicle.
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inclusion of collective-action clauses would thus mean higher borrowing costs for low-
rated sovereign borrowers, typically the governments of the poorest countries. In the
long run, however, it would apply additional pressure, through market discipline, for
them to upgrade their economic and financial practices and improve their
credit worthiness. Eichengreen and Mody conclude that the results of their research
"do not support the dire consequences predicted by some market participants of
including collective action clauses in loan contracts". Thus, if reform of the global
financial architecture is to strengthen market discipline:
"... by encouraging investors to more generously reward more creditworthy borrowers and
penalize less creditworthy ones, then more widespread adoption of collective action clauses,
which would reduce borrowing costs for the more creditworthy while raising them for their less
creditworthy counterparts, would seem to be a step in the right direction."
A more benign finding is presented in a recent article by Mark Gugiatti and
Anthony Richards. 24 The authors provide new empirical evidence regarding the way
financial markets and the international community deal with sovereign debt crises. In
particular, given the opposition investors and some sovereigns have to the greater use of
collective action clauses in emerging market bonds, the paper presents new evidence on
the way that financial markets have priced the use or non-use of CACs. Gugiatti and
Richards supplement existing evidence that the use of CACs in Euromarket issues has
not affected yields on new bond issues through an event study that shows that decisions
by issuers to change away from, or to, the use of CACs has also not affected the pricing
of issuers' existing stock of debt in the secondary market. They also provide new
evidence on the pricing of a large sample of bonds in the secondary market on 31
January 2003. Their data show that even after the intense debate about sovereign debt
restructuring through 2002, the inclusion or absence of CACs still had no
economically or statistically significant impact on yields as of early 2003. Hence the
authors conclude that either the investors still had not focused on which bonds have
CACs, or that they believe that the inclusion of CACs is not relevant to the pricing of
debt. The authors claim that the empirical evidence suggests that there is no good
reason why there cannot be greater use of CACs, including in bonds sold into the US
market. They argue that investors will benefit from well-targeted reforms in the way
that sovereign debt crises are handled. Indeed, Mexico's successful sale of global bonds
with CACs on 26 February 2003 (the first placement of bonds with CACs by an
emerging market sovereign into the US market) suggests that the long-held opposition
to CACs in some quarters may be easing.
Nevertheless, by itself, the Treasury's modified CACs is no panacea because it
does not automatically ensure an orderly restructuring or universal coverage of
sovereign debt. Collective action clauses can make a usefil contribution to the
24 Mark Gugiatti and Anthony Richards, Do Collective Action Clauses Influence Bond Yields? New Evidence from
Emerging Markets, Discussion Paper RDP2003-02 (Sydney: Reserve Bank of Australia, 2003).
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resolution of debt problems, especially in cases of illiquidity where a smoothing-out of
the debt service profile is required rather than a reduction in the net present value of the
sovereign's overall obligations. In fact, clauses work most effectively only on a bond-by-
bond basis-therefore, a debtor country would need a supermajority of holders of every
bond to agree to a restructuring. 25 When multiple bond issues need to be restructured,
clauses cannot prevent difficulties if a group of holdout investors obtains control of an
individual bond issue. Second, the new clauses would only apply to new bonds and
would therefore impact a relatively narrow scope of debt. On the other hand, the
SDRM would immediately cover all existing external sovereign debt once the statute
becomes effective-unlike in CACs where it will take some time before clauses are
included in all outstanding sovereign debt. Third, the Treasury's new clauses would not
allow for aggregation of debt across different instruments. That is, whereas clauses bind
holders only within the same bond issue, the SDRM would allow different bond
instruments to be aggregated into a single vote on the proposed restructuring, as in a
commercial debt restructuring. Yet, it should be noted that while the SDRM would
eliminate certain legal impediments to a rapid and orderly debt restructuring, it would
not remove the need to work out the macroeconomic policy adjustments required for
the country to meet payments on its rescheduled debt. Finally, if a country faces a
genuinely unsustainable debt burden and a solvency crisis rather than a short-term
liquidity problem, private creditors need to share the burden of restructuring by
limiting their demands for repayment or even agreeing to reduce the real value of their
claims.
Yet, questions regarding what financing the IMF should provide after the
restructuring, or to what type of debt the stay should apply, will need to be resolved
first. Similarly, sensitive issues regarding how countries that may be tempted to appeal
for debt relief through such mechanisms when such relief is not warranted can be
prevented from abusing the system needs to be resolved. After all, countries facing
severe liquidity problems go to extraordinary lengths to avoid restructuring their debts
to foreign and domestic creditors because they know that even an orderly debt
restructuring can damage their economy and banking system.
Given these challenges, it is better that the SDRM be institutionalized through an
amendment of the IMF's Articles of Agreement rather than through a new international
treaty-as Krueger proposal states. While a treaty would assure legal uniformity across
all jurisdictions, besides preventing conflicts arising from different interpretations in
different jurisdictions, creating a new international treaty would likely be a complicated
and uncertain undertaking. An international treaty would not only require unammous
vote and ratification by domestic parliaments, withdrawing from a freestanding treaty
after submitting a three-month notice and without any serious ramifications may prove
an easy-out have to the withdrawing country. On the other hand, while an amendment
25 This is because CACs only bind holders of a single bond issue-leaving unresolved the aggregation
problem of binding bondholders across different classes.
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to the IMF's articles would be required for the proposal to move to the operational
stage, such an amendment can take effect immediately when three-fifths of the
members having 85 percent of the voting power support it. Although such an
amendment is hardly guaranteed as it will require 60 percent majority of all IMF
members, including members accounting for 85 percent of the voting power, this
approach is still more feasible than getting every country to amend its domestic
bankruptcy law.2 6 Moreover, unlike an international treaty, withdrawing from the
Fund will entail costs because it will deprive the country of the benefits of membership
provided for under the articles of agreement.
VI. FUTURE PROSPECTS
Will the CAC effectively pre-empt the SDRM? The answer seems to be an
unequivocal yes. It is worth noting that in April 2002, the finance ministries and
central bank governors of the G-7 countries agreed on an historic G-7 Action Plan for
emerging markets. The plan called for the immediate introduction of collective
action clauses into sovereign debt contracts and further development of a sovereign
debt restructuring mechanism. 27 In September 2002, representatives of the private
sector, senior officials from the G-7 and senior officials from some key emerging
markets met at the US Treasury (the first meeting of this kind ever), to discuss key
aspects of collective action clauses. As expected, the private sector supported limited
use of collective action clauses provided it includes the use of supermajoity clauses
(90-95 percent) to amend payment and other important contract terms, and is
supplemented with mechanism to help protect investor rights by providing for clearer
documentation standards, as well as early warning of possible credit deterioration.
However, they strongly rejected the SDRM. Many of the emerging market countries
expressed support for the collective action clauses, but disapproval of the SDRM.
Similarly, all the G-7 officials reiterated their governments' support for incorporating
collective action clauses immediately, in addition to requiring that any sovereign-
including any member of the G-7-that issues bonds governed by the jurisdiction of
another sovereign should include collective action clauses. For example, the US
authorities not only endorsed their strong support for countries including collective
action clauses in external bond issues, the US Treasury also announced its decision to
encourage all countries that issue external bonds under New York law to include
collective action clauses in their offerings. This constitutes the strongest statement of
support for collective action clauses ever issued by the United States and the G-7-
albeit neither ruled out the SDRM-recommending the continuation of work on a
more specific proposal for the SDRM.
26 The IMF's articles of agreement have been amended before and it is therefore a process familiar to the
organization's members.
27 John B. Taylor, Itcreasing Economic Growth and Stability in Emerging Markets, 23 Cato Journal 1 (Spring-
Summer 2003), pp. 127-134.
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In December 2002, the Fund's executive board and the IMFC, which represents
the interests of the IMF's 184 member countries, formally encouraged Krueger to
investigate a "twin-track" approach for consideration at the IMFC's April 2003 spring
meeting. The approach was to include both a statutory approach to create a legal
framework that would allow a qualified majority of a country's creditors to approve a
restructuring agreement which would be binding on all, and a contractual approach to
incorporate comprehensive restructuring clauses, so-called "collective action clauses",
in debt instruments. The board noted that:
".... the SDRM must only address collective action problems among creditors, but also catalyze
an early and effective dialogue and exchange of information between the debtor and its creditors.
By creating greater predictability in the restructuring process, the SDRM should also be
expected to improve the functioning of international capital markets-an objective that should
remain a primary concern going forward."
28
The IMFC held its seventh meeting in Washington, D.C. on 12 April 2003. As
expected, it welcomed the inclusion of CACs by several countries, most recently
Mexico and Korea, in international sovereign bond issues. At that meeting, US
Treasury Secretary John Snow issued a statement noting that:
"... creating a more orderly and predictable process for debt restructuring has been a particular
priority in recent months. The United States welcomes the excellent progress made in
developing and incorporating collective action clauses in external sovereign bond contracts.
Mexico has shown strong leadership in issuing several bonds that include such clauses and
committing to include such clauses in all new bond issues. Mexico's successful issuances
demonstrate that emerging market countries can follow a contractual approach that would help
promote a more orderly restructuring process. We urge other emerging market borrowers to
follow Mexico's lead." 2
9
A few weeks later, the IMFC also announced its ringing support of the policy that
by June 2003 those EU countries issuing bonds under foreign jurisdictions will include
CACs. In addition, the IMFC praised the work of the G-10 emerging markets, and the
private sector in contributing to the development of CACs and the inclusion of CACs
in international bond issues becoming standard market practice. It instructed the IMF
to promote the voluntary inclusion of CACs in the context of its surveillance, besides
formulating a voluntary code of conduct for debtors and their creditors. The IMFC also
endorsed the work of the IMF in developing a concrete proposal for a statutory
sovereign debt restructuring mechanism. Although the IMFC acknowledged that it was
not feasible now to move forward to establish the SDRM4, it strongly supported that
work should continue on issues raised in its development that are of general relevance
to the orderly resolution of financial crises. These issues include inter-creditor equity
considerations, enhancing transparency and disclosure, and aggregation issues.
Nevertheless, while the board recognizes that institutional reforms will make it easier
28 IMF Board debates SDRM design, 32 IMF Survey 1 (23 January 2003), pp. 2-3
29 Statement by Treasury Secretary John Snow before the International Monetary and Financial Committee
of the IMF, IMF Office of Public Affairs, 12 April 2003.
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for the private sector to restructure unsustainable sovereign debts, besides providing a
viable alternative to IMF financial assistance, the reality is well noted by Paul Blustein:
"The top International Monetary Fund official who advanced a radical proposal to create an
international 'bankruptcy' system for countries has privately acknowledged that the plan has
failed to win enough support to move forward, according to people familiar with the matter.
Although she didn't pronounce the plan completely dead, Anne 0. Krueger, the IMF's first
deputy managing director, conceded that because of insufficient political backing there is at
present no chance for the legal changes necessary to establish a 'sovereign debt restructuring
mechanism' or SDRM ... In another sign that the plan is about to be shelved, John B. Taylor,
the US undersecretary of the Treasury for international affairs, said ... that fierce opposition
means the IMF proposal 'is not practical right now'. Bush administration officials have been
major skeptics, together with private international financiers and the governments of many
emerging market nations. The comments appear to herald the end of an extraordinary effort by
the IMF's management and staff to reshape the rules of the international economy with the aim
of providing a new approach for dealing with financial crises. That leaves the way clear for a
'voluntary' approach that Taylor proposed, in which emerging market countries borrowing
money would be encouraged to issue bonds with 'collective action clauses'. Taylor, while
stressing that the debate on the SDRM 'has been very useful' said 'from a practical perspective,
for now the clause approach is the one we should be focusing on'. "30
During the latter part of 2003 and early 2004, sovereign issues containing CACs
grew to represent more than 75 percent of total value of bonds issued in that period. In
September and November 2003, Turkey and Peru included CACs in their bonds
governed by New York law. These were the first non-investment grade countries to
issue New York law bonds with CACs. Since the beginning of 2004, Chile, Panama,
Colombia, Costa Rica and Venezuela completed successful bond issues, including
CACs for the first time. Brazil, Turkey and Mexico's recent issues again included
CACs-joining Belize, Guatemala, Korea, Italy, Poland, South Africa and Uruguay
which included CACs in bond issues last year. By such action, these countries are
making collective action clauses the market standard in external sovereign bond issues
under New York law. In its most recent communique, the IMFC welcomed the
inclusion of CACs by an increasing number of countries in their international
sovereign bonds and called on the IMF to promote the voluntary use of CACs by other
countries. The committee also encouraged the IMF to continue to contribute to the
efforts led by sovereign debtors and private creditors to develop a voluntary "Code of
Conduct", including the ongoing work on issues of general relevance to the orderly
resolution of financial crises through the use of aggregation clauses. 31 It is important to
note that while the committee recognizes that aggregation can contribute to the
resolution of both the collective action and creditors' coordination problems by binding
minority creditors across (as opposed to within) issuances, they also note that there are a
number of risks associated with such a mechanism. Aggregation could give rise to inter-
30 Paul Blustein, "Bankruptcy System for Nations Fails to Draw Support", Washington Post, 2 April 2003,
p. 15.
31 IMF, Progress Report to the International Monetary and Financial Committee on Crisis Resolution (Washington,
D.C.: IMF, April 2004).
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creditor equity concerns where, for example, a majority of creditors holding certain
claims imposes an agreement on a minority that holds very different claims. An
additional risk arises from possible manipulation of the voting process by the sovereign
debtor. On the other hand, a voluntary code of conduct respected by sovereign debtors
and private creditors could, in principle, facilitate dialogue between creditors and
debtors, promote corrective policy action to reduce the frequency and severity of crises,
and improve the prospects for an orderly resolution of crises.
VII. CONCLUSION
Clearly, an ideal debt restructuring reform would seek to achieve the following
objectives: (a) discourage countries from over-borrowing and creditors from over-
lending, (b) reduce the likelihood of sovereign debt crises by reducing moral hazard.
This can be effectively done by ensuring that creditors who were compensated ex ante
to bear risk, share appropriately in the expost losses, (c) before the debt burdens become
unsustainable, reduce the recognition lag during which economic conditions
deteriorate to the disadvantage of the debtor country and creditors before beginning
the restructuring process, (d) once the debt restructuring process has begun, ensure a
prompt resolution, and (e) try to reach a resolution that will enable the country to
regain access to stable capital flows.
Suffice to note, neither the SDRM nor the CACs by themselves will resolve the
problem of sovereign debt, nor are they the right solutions for all crises or even the
entire solution for those crises that make a sovereign debt restructuring necessary.
Clearly, the improved sovereign debt process will only deal with some crises since not
all crises are related to the sustainability of sovereign debt issued in foreign jurisdictions.
Currency and maturity mismatches in the private sector, exchange rate pegs, poor
supervision of financial institutions, and indexed domestic debt are other potential
sources of financial crises.
Yet, countries will continue to need temporary financial support to see them
through a genuine liquidity crisis, especially one that has its origins in external market
conditions rather than in domestic policy. In such cases, official financial support via the
IMF may be necessary. Thus, complementary measures such as strengthening the
assessment of debt sustainability, improving the predictability of access to exceptionally
large sums of IMF financing, revamping current lending facilities, and clarifying rules
on IMF lending to countries that are behind on payments to private creditors need to
support the work under way. Nevertheless, the failure to deal with the problem of
sovereign debt will leave the international community with the unpalatable choice of
accepting a disruptive and potentially contagious unilateral default, or bailing out
private creditors and thereby contributing to moral hazard.
As the recent case of Argentina dramatically illustrated, the economic collapse that
occurs when governments default is usually the result of reluctance on the part of the
authorities to confront the underlying policy problems or to approach the creditors for
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relief when debts have become unsustainable. In too many cases, the authorities
"gamble for redemption" by taking high-interest loans to repay pending ones and
experiment with ill-devised policy measures rather than face the uncertainty of
approaching the countries' private-sector creditors for the needed help.32 This problem
persists in large measure because at present there is no mechanism to assure that
governments that approach their creditors will be able to reach a negotiated settlement
and restructure their debts that is consistent with their capacity to pay. Moreover, they
have no assurance that the process of negotiating with creditors will be orderly,
predictable, and transparent. In the end both creditors and ordinary citizens, especially
the poor, suffer the most as a result of the economic fallout from financial crises. It is
because of this that the current proposals on sovereign debt restructuring need to be
taken seriously.
While the IMF's exploration of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism has
raised important issues, given the reactions of markets, the G-7 and various emerging
market countries, it is clear that the stakeholders are moving forward with collective
action clauses. As US Treasury Secretary Snow bluntly put it:
"... these clauses, and not a centralized mechanism, are the vehicle to resolve the issues
connected with sovereign debt restructuring. There can at times be 'collective action' problems
that prevent a prompt, orderly resolution of a sovereign debt crisis. The source of these problems
lies in the relationships and agreements of debtors and their creditors. It is these parties, not an
international organization that must assume responsibility for the solution. Therefore, it is
neither necessary nor feasible to continue working on SDRM."
Nevertheless, in coming weeks, efforts to strengthen the crisis resolution
framework through broad voluntary approaches will, no doubt, continue. However,
only time will tell if collective action clauses coupled with enhanced transparency and
disclosure can provide for a more stable and orderly international financial system.
32 Sometimes private creditors actively support this gambling by agreeing to lengthen repayment schedules in
return for higher interest payments.
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